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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Section 78 A-
4-103(2)(h), as this is a final order involving a domestic relations case. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78A-4-103(2)(h)(2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue # 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that 
petitioner's debts incurred solely by herself during the marriage, and without any 
knowledge, consent, input or control of the respondent should be shared by the 
respondent. 
Standard of Review: Appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact in divorce cases and will not overturn them unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^  14, 217 P.3d 733; Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, H 9, 176 P.3d 476. 
Whether property is marital or separate is "primarily . . . a question of law; 
therefore, we review the trial court's legal conclusions concerning the nature of property 
for correctness." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, Tf 11, 993 P.2d 887 (citing 
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 836 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (considering whether 401(k) 
plan is marital property)). 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: At trial evidence was presented to show that the 
trial court abused its discretion by finding that charges made exclusively by Appellee 
during the mamage should be shared by the Appellant. There was no evidence presented 
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as to the purpose for Appellee's credit purchases. The only evidence presented was the 
outstanding balances owing, and Appellee's vague and ambiguous testimony. (Ex. 54-
55; R. 118-19, 162, 178, 263, 280-84, 326-27. 
Issue # 2: Whether the Court abused its discretion by separating out water shares 
that were admitted to be "appurtenant" to their marital home on 1835 Gunderson Lane, 
Salt Lake City, Utah from the parties' mediated settlement contract which provided that 
the respondent be awarded all of petitioner's interest in the property in exchange for 
respondent paying petitioner $ 10.000. 
Standard of Review: Although appellate courts give great deference to a trial 
court's factual findings, conclusions of law arising from those findings are reviewed for 
correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 
169,^16, 235 P.3d 782. 
"'Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . . property distribution 
in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated.'" Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ^ 8, 176 P.3d 
476 (quoting Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). "[W]e 
review the trial court's legal conclusions concerning the nature of property for 
correctness." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, t 11, 993 P.2d 887. 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: At trial sufficient evidence was presented that a 
partial agreement had been reached at mediation whereat each party was represented by 
legal counsel. Petitioner testified that she was fully aware of the water shares 
appurtenant to the land acquired during the marriage. Petitioner's attorney drafted the 
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partial agreement which made no reference to the water shares. The agreement itself 
specifically provides for a payment of $10,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for all of her 
interest in the property which appertained to the water shares. 
Issue # 3: Whether the Court abused its discretion by finding that Appellant 
commingled premarital financial accounts and cash gifts from his mother made during 
the marriage with another account in which Appellant deposited traceable income earned 
during the marriage and paid business operation expenses and personal living expenses; 
and whether Appellant's premarital accounts lost their identity and character as separate 
property by temporarily depositing them into a joint account with the Appellee to protect 
them from seizure by his former spouse. 
Standard of Review: the standard of review is abuse of discretion: 
"'A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a 
divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.'" Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ^  6, 203 P.3d 1020 (quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT 
App 83, K 17, 45 P.3d 176) (alteration in original) (additional internal quotation 
marks omitted). On appeal, we therefore "will not disturb a property award unless 
we determine that there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, 
"[w]e review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of 
law." Id. 
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,1f1f 4-5, 217 P.3d 733. 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: At trial sufficient evidence was presented to show 
that the parties knowingly and intentionally kept their finances separate. Appellant 
admitted and bank statements proved that he made marital transactions, but also the 
evidence was that on one occasion only, did the Appellant make a temporary transfer of 
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his funds to an account in the sole name of the Appellee, which was for the intended 
purpose to protect those funds from is former wife. Once his fear of her accessing those 
funds had passed, he transferred the funds back to himself in an account under his name 
only. 
Issue # 4: Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 
discretion by independently accessing respondent's prior divorce action, and referring to 
it while conducting its own interrogation of the respondent at trial, and referencing it in 
the court's memorandum findings of fact, without prior notice to counsel. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which the court reviews for 
correctness without deference to the district court. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 32, 44 
P.3d 742 (questions of law reviewed for correctness). 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: At trial sufficient record was made in the transcript 
that the trial court independently accessed and familiarized itself with the appellant's 
prior divorce action in the Second District Court. The transcripts show that the trial court 
referenced appellant's prior divorce action in conducting its own fact finding 
interrogation of the appellant while he was on the witness stand during trial. 
Issue # 5: Whether the Court abused its discretion by awarding Appellee attorney 
fees and denying Appellant attorney fees. 
Standard of Review: u[B]oth the decision to award attorney fees and the amount 
of such fees are within the trial court's sound discretion. However, the trial court's award 
or denial of attorney fees must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
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spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 10, i 76 P.3d 476 (alteration in 
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An attorney fee must be based 
upon sufficient findings. Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ^ 14, 76 P.3d 716. 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: At trial, Appellant testified that he incurred attorney 
fees in successfully defending himself against Appellee's petition to obtain a protective 
order. Appellant's testimony and the evidence was further that he lacks resources to pay 
attorney fees to Appellee; further that he prevailed on many of the disputed issues at trial. 
(R. 388-94.) 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND 
REGULATIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, or regulations that are 
determinative of this case. 
Statutes: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (2007) provides, in relevant part: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3(1) (2007) provides: 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate 
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action 
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to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, 
and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other 
party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of 
the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 15, 2010 arising from a two-
day bench trial in a divorce proceeding before Judge Robert K. Hilder, Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County. The findings of fact issued by the Court on July 2, 2010 was 
reduced to a final divorce decree that was entered on July 15, 2010. Each party testified 
that they had been married and divorced once before. Each testified that they 
intentionally kept all of their finances and debts separate and that neither made any 
contributions to any financial assets of the other. 
During the marriage respondent made transfers of premarital funds and funds 
given him by his mother into accounts in Fidelity Investments that were held under his 
"Liston Family Trust." During the marriage a portion of his funds were temporarily 
transferred into a joint marital account with the Appellee for approximately six months. 
It was conceded that he alone used and managed these funds. The transfer was for a brief 
period of approximately six months, and was made to avoid seizure by his former spouse. 
A separate account at Barnes Bank was used as a depository for respondent's earnings 
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derived during the marriage and to pay business operating expenses that were incurred to 
generate that income. 
Also during the marriage, the parties purchased a marital home located at 1835 
East Gundersen Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. In the course of participating in mandatory 
divorce mediation with their respective legal counsel, the parties and their legal counsel 
entered into a partial stipulation in which the Appellee agreed to grant respondent a 
quitclaim deed to convey to him all of her interest therein in exchange for $10,000.00 in 
full settlement of any claims she had therein. 
Appurtenant to the real property were four water shares issued through Holliday 
Water Company. Appellee called a witness from the water company, who testified that 
the number of shares determines how much water the owner can use without incurring an 
additional fee. At least one share must remain with the land, but a single share would be 
inadequate for normal water consumption. At trial the Appellee argued that water shares, 
which specifically state on their face are "appurtenant" to the land, should be segregated 
out from the mediation contract and that she should be awarded an equitable share of the 
water shares. The trial court agreed and made a finding of fact as to the value of each 
share, then made an award thereof to the Appellee. 
During the trial the court accessed the docket from Appellant's prior divorce 
action in Second District, Davis County, Utah. The court independently and without 
request or advance notice to either party's counsel, referred to that docket and conducted 
its own interrogation of the Appellant while he was under oath. The court made several 
references to Appellant's prior divorce action during the trial and in making its findings 
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of fact and orders under the decree. Appellant asserts that the court exceeded its 
authority as an impartial finder of fact and improperly conducted its own discovery and 
became an adversary to the Appellant. The court was biased against the Appellant, which 
manifested itself in the manner in which it exercised its discretionary authority in 
determining and dividing the marital estate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24 and 25, 2010 a trial was conducted before Third District Court Judge 
Robert K. Hilder. Each party provided sworn testimony on disputed issues that were 
certified for trial. The parties were both 73 years old at the time of trial. (Findings, 1.) 
Each were married and divorced twice before. (R. 272-73, 298.) The parties cohabited 
approximately in 1999 while Appellant was in the process of obtaining his second 
divorce and married in May 2002. (R. 21; Findings, 2.) 
Appellee testified that her monthly income consists of $1,055.00 per month in 
Social Security income. (R. 278.) She pays out approximately $2,100.00 per month in 
minimum payments for her five credit card payments in addition to approximately 
$950.00 for trailer rent and utilities (R. 278-279), but did not introduce a financial 
declaration statement as an exhibit (R. 276). 
Appellant testified with regards to Appellee's Exhibit 8 that after deducting $78.20 
for Medicare, he receives $1,368.00 per month in Social Security income and an 
additional $200.00 per month from an annuity. He also receives a variable amount of 
income from a Fidelity annuity that at one time was $459.00 per month but is impacted 
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by market conditions. (R. 312, 314-15; Appellee's Ex. 8; Appellant's Ex. 15.) From this 
income, Appellant paid $1,254.06 against the mortgage on the Gundersen Lane marital 
home. (R. 315.) Appellant further testified that his monthly expenses are $5,068.49. 
(Appellant's Ex. 15.) 
Appellant's Mountain Lion Engineering Business 
Sometime between 1999 and 2000, Appellant formed a corporation doing business 
as "Mountain Lion Engineering." Mountain Lion Engineering was a corporation that 
Appellant started up prior to the marriage after being laid off. (R. 307-08.) Appellant 
performed freelance engineering consultation in this business for a time during the 
marriage. (R. 10, 54, 442.) Appellant deposited monies earned in this business during 
the course of the marriage into a Barnes Banking account. (R. 54-56, 59, 420-21; Ex. 9, 
59.) Some of his earnings were paid for consulting services to Conestoga Cold Storage. 
(R. 309; Ex. 10.) 
The Barnes Bank account was permissibly held under the name of Appellant's 
mother Lorena K. Liston. (R. 112, 302-03; Ex. 27.) Appellant used the Barnes Bank 
account to pay for business operation expenses for Mountain Lion Engineering. (R. 311, 
421, Ex. 59.) Some of Appellants' earnings received during the marriage were also 
deposited into his Fidelity Investments account. (R. 422; Exhibits 31-35.) 
Appellant's management and transfers of funds in different accounts during 
marriage 
Appellant testified that there never was a joint bank account. (R. 326.) The 
evidence admitted includes a single financial account held in Appellant's name only. 
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(Appellee's Ex. 36.) Appellant transferred funds from the Barnes Bank account into his 
premarital Fidelity Investments Account. (R. 56, 113-14; Ex. 9, 59.) Appellant used his 
mother's bank account for years. (R. 117.) Appellant also would deposit his social 
security income, Fidelity Investments income and transferred money from his business 
into the Barnes Bank account (R. 303.) Appellant employed this method of finance 
management to avoid further loss of his premarital assets to gamishment procedure by his 
former wife. (R. 300-02.) This methodology was reaffirmed by the Appellant several 
times during the trial and was neither secretive nor a fact withheld to Appellee. Appellee 
testified that the Appellant transferred money through his mother's account and then 
through his premarital Fidelity Investments accounts. (R. 147, 153.) 
Appellee testified that the Appellant had been married twice before and that he 
was fearful of his ex-wife accessing his money. (R. 156-57, 160.) Appellant did not 
dispute this testimony. (R. 300-03.) Appellee consented to and did not object to the 
method by which Appellant managed his banking through the use of his mother's name. 
(R. 158.) Appellee admitted that she had no ownership in any of Appellant's accounts 
(R. 174), and never had a joint account with Appellant (R. 175). Appellee made no 
contributions of her own into Appellant's accounts. (R. 176.) Appellant affirmed her 
testimony that there were never any joint accounts, that he never signed any of 
Appellee's checks, and that Appellee had no authority to sign any of his checks. (R. 326.) 
Appellant's testimony and evidence as to sources of funds and marital 
transfers 
Appellant's rebuttal testimony and evidence was that he had the following 
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financial accounts: Exhibits 9, 11, 20, 30, 31, 36, 37, 44, 45, 47. 
Capital One Account. (Ex. 20; R. 424.) 
This was the depository of funds Appellant received from the decree in his former 
divorce, Betty Liston, of Vi of her IRA account which was entirely premarital to this case 
and not in dispute. (R. 364, 366-67.) Appellant stopped contributing to this account in 
1998. (R. 367.) Appellant received $7,700.00 from his portion of his ex wife's Betty 
Liston's IRA in that divorce action in the Second District Court, and withdrew $8,160.00 
from that same account to comply with a minimum required distribution from the 
account. (R. 365.) These funds were transferred into account Z83225584 which was 
closed. (R. 367.) 
Fidelity Investments Account Z83225584 (Exhibits 47-50.) 
This account was the repository of Appellant's pre-marital Capital One account. 
Appellee's expert, Rebecca Schreyer, testified that she made an assumption that 
the entire portion of Appellant's premarital IRA funds were transferred into the 
Z83225584 account in making conclusions that transactions made during the marriage 
involved marital funds. (R. 211.) Appellant rebutted those assumptions and testified that 
he did not transfer either his premarital IRA accounts (129-182680, 2B923460) into this 
account. (R. 370.) He testified that a withdrawal was required under what was called a 
"minimum required distribution" transaction on December 31, 2007. At that time 
Appellant transferred $8,160.05 from IRA account 129-182680 into account Z83225584. 
(R. 370-71.) 
On March 28, 2008, the entire account of Z83225584 was transferred into Fidelity 
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Investments account number Z71675385 which account was under Appellant's name 
only. This was done to consolidate statements into a single statement and to transfer all 
funds into Appellant's name. (R. 372.) 
Court Exhibit #105 responds to Appellee's Exhibit #28: a letter from Rebecca 
Schreyer CPA which were her conclusions, based on her assumptions and research of 
Appellant's financial accounts. 
Fidelity Investments account X29175706 Ex. 31-35. Appellant made deposits of 
$10,000.00, $63,000.00 and $4,500.00 respectively into this account which funds were 
gifts from his mother. (R. 437; Ex. 32-35.) Appellant testified that his Exhibit 1, the 
Fidelity Investment Account Z29175706 (Appellee's Ex. 31) originated with a 
$10,000.00 deposit which was a gift from his mother, Lorena, in December 2000 over 
two years prior to the parties' marriage. (R. 333.) He testified that the entire source of 
funds into this account came from gifts by his mother, Lorena Liston. (R. 347-48, 352.) 
His testimony was further that earnings were placed in other accounts. (R. 352.) 
Fidelity Investments account X-29-253-162 held in Appellee Annette Liston's 
name only. (Ex. 36.) Appellant freely admitted to transferring funds from all other 
accounts into this account during the marriage for an approximate six month period to 
shield and protect those assets from access by his former wife, Betty Liston. He never 
intended to share any interest therein with Appellee. (R. 345-47, 354.) When the 
perceived threat no longer existed, he transferred the funds into Fidelity Investments 
account Z-85-347442 and closed the account ending in 162. (R. 355.) 
Fidelity Investments account Z-85-347442. (Ex. 37.) This account was created 
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on November 29, 2004 with a beginning balance of $30,000.00 which came from a 
transfer of funds from the Barnes Bank which Appellant considered his personal account 
but which was in his mother's name, Lorena Liston. (R. 355-56.) Appellee's witness, 
Rebecca Schreyer testified that this beginning balance was Appellee's premarital 
property. (R. 215.) 
All funds originally held and transacted in account ending in #706 were 
eventually deposited into Fidelity Account ending in #442. (R. 360.) 
Barnes Bank. (Ex. 59.) Appellant employed this account to deposit earnings 
from Mountain Lion Engineering and to pay business operating expenses from that 
business. No cash gifts from Appellant's mother were deposited into this account. (R. 
357.) 
Appellant established his "Liston Family Trust" in 1999 which held all of his 
accounts and was established for the benefit of his two daughters and grandson (R. 335), 
and to protect the assets from garnishment by his former wife, Betty Liston. (Appellant's 
trial exhibit 7; R. 383-84.) 
On July 16, 2003 Appellant received $41,900.05 from his mother which he 
deposited and, within a few days, transferred to his Fidelity Investments account. (R. 
337-38.) The original deposit slip was produced as a part of Appellant's Exhibit 1, but 
the deposit slip itself did not show the source of the funds. (R. 338.) The only evidence 
that it sourced from Appellant's mother was his own testimony. (R. 341.) 
Appellant received a K-l IRS form which he used to prepare his mother's tax 
return. He testified that it was a gift from his mother. (R. 342-43.) Appellant testified that 
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following his receipt of $41,900.95 gifted to him by his mother, he gifted the funds to 
Appellee. (R. 344-45, 347-48.) This had been Appellant's practice ever since 2004. (R. 
345.) Appellee made no contributions of any kind deposited into any of Appellant's 
financial accounts. (R. 348.) 
Appellant testified that all of his money and other money earned during the 
marriage eventually end up in his Fidelity Investments account ending in #442. (R. 349.) 
When the court inquired if he understood that earnings during the marriage are marital 
property, and that if marital property went into whatever account, it could be deemed 
marital property, Appellant stated that he did, but also understood that the parties had a 
verbal agreement to keep their businesses separate and that the divorce petition pled that 
each party be awarded their separate businesses. (R. 349.) Appellant's specific purpose 
and intent in these transfers was to shield and protect the money from his ex wife and 
anybody else, and not to create an interest in the Appellee. (R. 354. Ex. 1.) 
When the perceived threat no longer existed, he transferred the funds from the 
account that was solely in Appellee's name back to his separate Fidelity Investment IRA 
account ending in #442. (R. 353-54.) This occurred during the marriage on January 31, 
2005 (R. 355), at which time account ending in #162 no longer existed (R. 355). 
Liston Family Trust. (Appellant's Ex, 7.) Appellant created this trust in 1999 
to protect financial assets from former wife, Betty. (R. 383-84.) All of his financial 
accounts are held under this trust. (R. 394.) 
Water Shares Appurtenant to Gundersen Lane Property 
During the marriage the parties purchased a home located at 1865 Gundersen 
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Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 435, Findings, 8-10.) Appellee agreed to execute a quit 
claim deed and convey "all of her interest" in the Gundersen Lane property to the 
Appellant in exchange for $10,000.00. (Ex. 16.) "The Court finds that the $10,000.00 
was consideration for petitioner giving up all interest in the real property on Gundersen 
Lane." (Findings, 10.) 
Appurtenant to this land were four water shares issued through Holliday Water 
Company. (Ex. 17; Findings, 10.) The partial mediation agreement (Ex. 16), makes no 
reference to any water shares. Segregating the water shares from the agreement to deed 
her interest to Appellant in exchange for $10,000.00 was never discussed, nor part of the 
mediation agreement. (R. 68, 79.) Appellee admitted that she was aware of the water 
shares issue at the time of mediation and that it was not made a part of the partial 
mediation agreement. (R. 190.) Both the Appellee and her expert Marlin K. Sundberg 
who is the manager of Holliday Water Company, testified that the value of each water 
share is $5,000.00. (R. 70, 247.) 
Appellee and her expert Marlin Sundberg both testified that at least one water 
share must remain with the property but other shares could be sold. (R. 70, 242-43.) They 
further stated that one water share entitles the owner to 60,000 gallons of free water per 
year, which represents about twenty percent of the modest requirements of one family. 
(Findings, 10.) The Court found that only one of the four shares is in fact appurtenant to 
the property, and that this single share is absolutely necessary to permit the property 
owner to receive culinary water from Holliday Water Company. (Findings, 10.) 
The court then found that the remaining three water shares were undisputedly 
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valued at $5,000.00 each (Findings, 10), and that they were non-appurtenant marital 
property (Findings, 11). The Court awarded Appellee $7,500.00 for her interest in the 
three non-appurtenant water shares with Holliday Water Company, or in the alternative, 
ordered respondent to transfer one share to Appellee and pay her $ 2,500.00 to equalize 
the distribution of water shares. (Decree, f^ 5.) 
Appellee's Credit Card Usage 
Appellee used a Discover Card and a Chase credit card during the marriage which 
she testified were in her own name exclusively and presented evidence as to the balances 
owing on several accounts. No evidence was presented as to the purpose of the debts she 
incurred, nor was there evidence as to what the purchases were for. (Ex. 54-55; R. 118-
19, 284.) The only evidence pertaining to Appellee's credit cards were balances owing 
and did not set forth what charges were made nor when. (R. 178, Ex. 54-55.) Appellee 
testified that she has to live on credit cards and that she was $50,000.00 in debt. (R. 162.) 
Appellee further testified that over the course of five years of marriage with 
Appellant she incurred debt on her Discover Card and $17,995.70 on her Chase card to 
pay for meals out, groceries, things for the house, gas for the car, clothing and two trips 
to see her father, one of which was to attend his funeral. Also that both she and 
Appellant received benefits through these credit charges. (R. 118-19). 
Appellant testified that Appellee's contributions to the marriage were minimal and 
that he and Appellee had a common understanding that each would manage their finances 
separately. (R. 326-27.) Appellee testified that it was not always her intention to keep 
finances separate, but that it was the practice of the parties. (R. 263.) Appellee admitted 
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that she and Aeppellant lived together before the marriage during which time they also 
kept their finances separate. (R. 264.) Appellee testified that her contributions to the 
marriage included the shirt Appellant was wearing to trial, "creature comforts" and all of 
their food. (R. 280.) Appellee admitted under oath that the credit cards in question were 
in her name only, that the Appellant had no access to those cards, and that she was the 
only person that could make a purchase on those cards. (R. 283-84.) 
Appellee testified that between $ 30,000 and $ 35,000 of her current debt was 
incurred during the marriage (R. 281-83), which Appellant, through counsel, argued was 
her actual "contribution" during the marriage (R. 283). Appellee further testified that she 
can only afford to make the minimum monthly payments on her Chase Bank of $550.00, 
Wells Fargo $400.00 and Discover Card of $400.00 per month. (R. 277.) She testified 
that that recently to the time of trial had incurred $6,000.00 in additional credit debt 
through Zion's: "the payment is running about - I don't know- $250 - $300.00" (R. 278), 
and that Appellant had no control over her use of her credit cards (R. 176). 
The court found that the Appellee "incurred debt related to family expenses in the 
amount of at least $30,500.00 which was unpaid debt at the time of separation." 
(Findings, 6 at 1f 13.) "Except for a disputed item regarding purchase of a motor vehicle, 
there is no evidence to suggest that any purchases on the account at issue were for 
petitioner's individual benefit. . . ." (Findings, 6 at j^ 13.) 
Her attorney fees 
The Court found that Appellee incurred attorney fees to obtain information and 
evidence as to Appellant's purchase of a house located in Farmington, Utah during the 
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marriage. In that regard the Court awarded Appellee $500.00 (Decree, ^ 14), and 
awarded Appellee an additional $5,000.00 in attorney fees (Findings, 14). 
During the course of this case the parties scheduled mediations which Appellee 
claimed were cancelled by Appellant. (R. 62-65.) Appellee later admitted that it was 
done by mutual consent, and that for two years she had been represented by an attorney 
and had plenty of opportunities to discuss and review all issues brought to court. (R. 189.) 
The parties were able to settle some of the disputed issues at mediation and reduced those 
agreements to a partial stipulation. (R. 65; Ex. 16.) The agreement was drafted by 
Appellant's attorney. (R. 190.) 
His Attorney Fees 
Appellant incurred attorney fees in successfully defending himself against 
Appellee's petition to obtain a protective order against him in June 2009 (R. 388-93) and 
in this action. 
Appellee's C.P.A. Witness 
Appellee called Rebecca Schreyer, C.P.A. as an expert witness. (R. 203.) 
Appellant's attorney Clark R. Ward objected to the witness under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 26. (R. 125.) The trial court overruled the objection and allowed 
the witness to testify. (R. 126.) 
Ms. Schreyer testified that she prepared a report of her findings from materials 
provided to her by Appellee in a letter. (R. 207; Ex. 28, 29.) From her findings she 
formed an opinion as to the marital portion of Appellant's Fidelity Investment account as 
of the date of separation of the parties - January 15, 2008. (R. 207.) 
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Barnes Bank Account - Appellee's Eexhibit 59. The witness did not 
address this account nor did she provide any analysis as to the source from which this 
account was funded or how it was used during the marriage. 
Appellant's premarital IRA account 2B923460 
The witness found that Appellant entered the marriage with a rollover IRA 
account number 2B923460, and that there were no additions or reductions to this account 
during the marriage period of May 2002 and January 15, 2008. (R. 208-09.) 
Appellant's Fidelity Investments Account X29175706 
The witness also found that Appellant had a Fidelity Investment account number 
X29175706 with a premarital balance of $72,065.66. (R. 209.) During the marriage, 
deposits of $10,000.00 in 2002, $63,000.00 in July 2003 and $4,500.00 in March 2004 
were made. (R. 208-10.) All of these deposits were made into the Liston Family Trust. 
(R. 210.) 
The witness opined that the account grew during the marriage to a sum of 
$163,219.18 and that during the marriage the entire account was transferred to a Fidelity 
Investment Account number X29253162 which was in the sole name of Appellee Annette 
Liston. (R. 211, Ex. 36.) Some of these funds of were Appellant's premarital funds. (R. 
211.) All funds were thereafter eventually transferred into another account held under the 
name of Lorena K. Liston, account number 285347442. (R. 212.) 
The witness testified that Lorena Liston opened an account in November 2004 
with $30,000.00 in premarital funds. (R. 213, 215-16.) There were additional deposits 
totaling either $90,000.00 or $115,000.00 during the marriage. (R. 214; Exhibits 40-42.) 
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This account grew to $357,334.89. (R. 213-14.) Ms. Schreyer testified that according to 
her, the marital portion of this account grew to be $262,375.79 by April 2008. (R. 216-
17.) All of these funds were then later transferred into Appellant's Fidelity Investments 
account number Z85347442. (R. 217.) An additional $97,959.10 was deemed to be 
Appellant's separate property. (R. 217.) 
There were transfers from Lorena Liston's account number Z85347442 into 
Appellant's account in the sum of $357,344.89. (Ex. 44; R. 217.) Appellant's entire 
account was transferred into Appellees' Fidelity Investment Account number X29253162 
during the marriage (R. 211), and account number Z85347442 (R. 212). 
Another account, 129-182680 was a retirement account that had a balance on 
April 1, 2002 of $123,215.12 (R. 217), which was characterized as Appellant's premarital 
account and was not factored into Ms. Schreyer's ultimate conclusions regarding what 
Appellee's marital portion was (R. 218). Appellant affirmed this in his testimony. (R. 
367.) 
Schreyer testified that during November 2006 one deposit of $7,764.52 was made 
into Fidelity Investments account number Z853223584 and a transfer to this same 
account of $ 8,160.65 was made in December 2007. She assumed that the entire marital 
portion of the IRA account was transferred to the Z853223584 account (R. 218), which 
was the Lorena K. Liston account. The entire balance of $ 24,924.61 in that account was 
transferred into a new account number Z71675385 in March 2005. (R. 219-20; Ex. 46-
48,51.) 
By April 2008 all funds had been transferred back to the name of the Appellant. 
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(R. 222.) The value then was $ 613,577.92. The witness reduced the marital portion by 
finding $97,027.00 was Appellant's premarital asset (R. 223), leaving a marital balance 
of $293,558.00. She then split that amount into equal halves leaving each party with a 
share of $146,779.00. (R. 222.) The court awarded Appellant $136,525.00 as her marital 
interest from the parties investment accounts. (Findings, 18; Decree, f^ 8.) 
The witness admitted to difficulty in characterizing the various accounts, but 
summarized her findings that Appellant started the accounts before the marriage, added 
funds during the marriage, then made transfers into an account under Appellee's name, 
then to his mother Lorena Liston, then transferred them all back to himself. (R. 223-24.) 
Ms. Schreyer's stated understanding of the differences between premarital and 
marital assets was that anything done during the marriage was "marital" (R. 225), and 
that any deposit made during a marriage is by her definition "marital" (R. 231). She 
further stated that the sales proceeds from a portion of the Gundersen Lane property 
would have funded a lot of the deposit into the account. (R. 225.) 
Ms. Schreyer testified that she did not look at the source of funds into the accounts 
transferred, only if they occurred during the marriage (R. 232), but concluded that there 
was a comingling of assets (R. 226), and that $147,779.00 was a fair distribution of what 
she defined were marital assets (R. 227-28). She testified that she could "only surmise" 
the source of funds deposited (R. 229), and that she did not know the source of funds 
deposited (R. 230). Ms. Schreyer further testified that she had never testified in a divorce 
setting before (R. 236), that she did not consider herself an expert witness, and that her 
work is not normally done for divorce cases (R. 234). 
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Judge Hilder's unsolicited independent access to Appellant's prior divorce 
action 
During direct examination of Appellant, and without any prior notice to or request 
by counsel for either party, Judge Hilder accessed Appellant's prior divorce action in 
Davis County, Utah and began to reference its 42-page docket while conducting its own 
examination of Appellant. (R. 346-47, 444.) The court cited when Judge Jon Memmott 
invalidated the pre-nuptial agreement Appellant had with his then wife (R. 350), and 
cited representations made before the Court Commissioner in that case, David Dillon, 
relating to his sources and amounts of income (R. 445, Findings,)} 8-10). 
As the trial proceeded the court took an increasing role as an advocate and finder 
of fact. (R. 444-49,451-53.) 
The Court denied the following requests made by Appellee: 
Appellee's request for alimony was denied. (Decree, J^ 6.) 
Appellee's request for an award of compensation in Appellant's violins was 
denied. (Decree, f^ 10.) 
Appellee's was awarded her wedding ring in its present condition and her claim 
that the ring had been altered to replace a diamond stone setting with a cubic zirconia was 
denied. (Decree, |^ 11.) 
Appellee's request for an interest in Appellant's 1963 Chevrolet pick-up, his 1942 
Ford and other vehicles, engines and miscellaneous other non-specified items listed at 
trial was denied. (Decree, J^ 13.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court abused its discretion when it found that $ 30,500 of Appellee's credit 
card debts were a marital obligation where there was insufficient evidence to support the 
determination that such obligations were incurred for family purposes. Appellant did not 
have any control over Appellee's credit card usage. Furthermore, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the court to find that the water shares were not covered by the mediated 
agreement and that they were not appurtenant to the land. The water shares stated on 
their face that they were appurtenant. 
The court abused its discretion in determining that $ 273,050 in Appellant's 
accounts was marital property. Appellant asserts that a substantial portion of these funds 
were his traceable premarital property and gifts from his mother. The court erred and 
abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of records in Appellant's prior divorce case 
and using them to question Appellant where those files were not placed in evidence. 
Furthermore, the court abandoned its impartial role and infringed on counsel's role of 
advocacy when it sought out additional evidence in the case and used the records without 
prior notice. 
It was an abuse of discretion to award Appellee attorney fees. The court did not 
find that Appellee was in need of attorney fees and counsel did not submit an affidavit of 
attorney fees, which is necessary to determine that attorney fees are reasonable. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING 
APPELLEE'S DEBTS INCURRED SOLELY BY HERSELF DURING THE 
MARRIAGE, AND WITHOUT ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, CONSENT, INPUT 
OR CONTROL OF APPELLANT SHOULD BE SHARED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant asserts that the court abused its discretion when it found that $30,500 of 
Appellee's credit card debts were "a marital obligation, to be shared equally." (Findings, 
12.) '"Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of 
review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses."' Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ^ 44, 176 
P.3d476 (citing Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Fulfilling Marshalling Requirement 
Appellant submits this section in compliance with the marshalling requirement. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) states, u[a] party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(9). The court in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) described the marshaling requirement: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
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West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991); see also 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 77. Appellant sets forward the following evidence which 
could support the finding of the District Court: 
1. Appellee presented evidence regarding the balances on her credit cards. (R. 178; 
Ex. 54, 55.) 
2. Appellee testified that she has to live on credit cards and was $50,000 in debt. (R. 
162.) 
3. The court stated that "[petitioner did not have the income to support many of the 
expenses she was called upon to pay during the marriage. It is true that petitioner 
terminated full-time work, and cut back substantially on her part-time working 
activities, but at the time of the marriage each of the parties was 65 years old." 
(Findings, 11). 
4. Appellee testified she incurred credit card debt to pay for meals out, groceries, 
things for the house, gas for the car, clothing, and two trips to see her father. (R. 
118-19.) She testified she paid for all the parties' food. (R. 280.) 
5. The court found that "[djuring the marriage, petitioner paid for many day-to-day 
expenses, including food, entertainment, Christmas for families, and travel." 
(Findings, 11.) 
6. Appellee testified that both she and Appellant received benefits through these 
credit charges. (R. 118-19.) 
7. Appellant testified that between $30,000 and $35,000 of her current debt was 
incurred during the marriage. (R. 281-83.) 
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8. The court found that petitioner had established debts of at least $30,500, which 
debts constituted "a marital obligation, to be shared equally." (Findings, 12.) 
A. The trial court abused its discretion when it found that $30,500 of 
Appellee's credit card debt was a marital debt 
The parties each testified that they had always practiced keeping their finances 
separate. At no time did they share a credit card. That notwithstanding, each party 
admitted to using their credit cards during the marriage for general entertainment and 
small purchases. 
Argument in Favor of Upholding Judgment 
Appellee's testimony that she used her Discover Card and Chase Card for general 
family purposes that included meals out of the home and things for the house. A 
presumption should exist that purchases made during the marriage were for general 
marital purposes that benefitted both parties. The broad discretionary powers of the trial 
court are intended to resolve this issue because it is virtually impossible and overly 
burdensome to examine each purchase one-by-one. There was no contrary evidence to 
rebut petitioner's testimony. Accordingly the trial court acted appropriately in dividing 
the marital portion of Appellee's credit card balances as it did. Appellant was willing to 
allow Appellee to use her credit cards and benefit from her charges as he produced no 
testimony of any protest or objection to her use of the cards. 
Argument Against Affirming The Judgment 
Appellee testified that Appellant had no authority to use her credit card and 
offered no evidence that the massive credit she had incurred during the marriage was for 
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joint family purposes. Her bare testimony that she incurred debt for marital purposes was 
not supported by the statements themselves. The trial court found that with the exception 
of a disputed purchase of a motor vehicle, there was "no evidence to suggest that any 
purchases on the account at issue were for petitioner's individual benefit." (Findings, 6 at 
Tf 13.) This ignores Appellee's own testimony that she charged two trips to see her dying 
father in California, bought gas for her car, and purchased clothing. It further ignores the 
fact that petitioner's evidence in support of her claim of marital debt completely lacked 
anything to support it. There were no statements to demonstrate that petitioner's charges 
were not actually carry-over premarital charges or that that they were primarily for her 
clothing and personal entertainment, alluded to in her testimony. The only evidence 
admitted included balances owing and her testimony. 
Appellant testified that he used his own credit card for general purposes and that 
he was entirely powerless to know or control petitioner's spending. Appellee testified that 
she "contributed" to the marriage but the only financial contribution she made was to 
incur massive and uncontrollable debt. (R. 283.) 
An individual in such a powerless and ignorant position should not be held jointly 
liable for debts incurred during a marriage by a spouse who is concealing the use of their 
individual credit account. Being completely shut out of how Appellee was using her 
credit cards, he had no reason to protest and was an innocent bystander while Appellee 
was withholding her use of credit cards from him. It was a clear abuse of the court's 
discretion to penalize Appellant for staying in the mamage while unbeknownst to him his 
financial penalty for doing so was increasing by the month. 
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SEPARATED WATER SHARES THAT WERE APPURTENANT TO THE 
PROPERTY AT 1835 EAST GUNDERSEN LANE, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
FROM THE PARTIAL SETTLEMENT CONTRACT 
Fulfilling Marshalling Requirement 
Appellant submits the following evidence to comply with his duty under U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding which he 
challenges: 
1. During the marriage, the parties purchased a home located at 1835 Gunderson 
Lane in Salt Lake County. (Findings, 8.) 
2. The parties entered into a stipulation that provided that "petitioner should receive 
$10,000 upon execution of a Quit-Claim Deed." In so doing, petitioner would 
convey any interest she may have in the real property at 1835 Gunderson Lane. 
(Findings, 9.) 
3. There were four water shares in the HoUiday Water Company which were related 
to the property. (Findings, 10.) 
4. The issue of the water shares was not discussed in mediation, nor were the water 
shares explicitly addressed in the parties' stipulation. (R. 68, 79.) 
5. Marlin K. Sundberg, manager of the HoUiday Water Company, and Appellee both 
testified that at least one water share must remain with the property but the other 
shares could be sold. (R. 70, 242-43.) One share "is tied to the single meter on 
the property . . . and is absolutely necessary to permit the property owner to 
receive culinary water from the HoUiday Water Company." (Findings, 10.) 
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6. "Based on the testimony of the manager of the Holliday Water Company 
Manager, which the court found to be persuasive, the court [found] that only one 
of the four shares is in fact appurtenant to the property." (Findings, 10.) 
7. "[F]or each share held, the owner is entitled to 60,000 gallons of free water each 
year, perhaps twenty percent of the modest requirements of one family." 
(Findings, 10.) 
8. The court valued each share at $5,000, based on the testimony of Marlin 
Sundberg. Mr. Sundberg stated that $5,000 is the market price of water shares for 
individuals who wish to obtain a new service to a new meter. (See R. 70, 247; 
Findings, 10-11.) 
9. "The Court determine[ed] that the three non-appurtenant water shares were not 
covered by the mediation agreement for satisfaction of petitioner's interest in the 
real property." (Findings, 11.) 
10. The court found the three non-appurtenant shares to be "marital property, with a 
total value of $15,000," and divided that $15,000 interest equally between the 
parties. (Findings, 11.) 
11. Mr. Marlin Sundberg of the Holladay Water Company testified that the company 
sells water shares for $5,000.00 each. (R. 247.) 
A. The court abused its discretion in determining that the water shares were 
not appurtenant to the land and that they were not covered by the parties' 
mediated agreement. 
Under Utah law, a stipulation reached by divorcing spouses regarding property 
division should be recognized and enforced by the courts. Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 
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216, U 3, 138 P.3d 63 (slip op.) (noting that spouses have general authority "to arrange 
property rights by contract.") (quoting Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ^  24, 984 P.2d 987)); 
Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, f 15, 981 P.2d 403 ("Stipulations entered into "in 
contemplation of a divorce 'are conclusive and binding on the parties unless, upon timely 
notice and for good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom."' (quoting Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 
789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "a parties' stipulation as to property rights in a 
divorce action . . . [is] advisory and usually followed"). 
"[PJarties to litigation are free - indeed encouraged - to stipulate to the resolution 
of their disputes and, when they do so, the courts of this state will enforce those 
agreements as written and will not paternalistically substitute their judgment for that of 
the parties." Sill v. Sill, 2007 UT App 173, ^ 23, 164 P.3d 415 (J. Orme concurring). 
Accordingly, when a party agrees to sign a settlement, he or she "waivefs] the right to 
claim that such agreement should contain additional or different terms." Stone v. Stone, 
2008 UT App 154 at * 1 (slip op. May 1, 2008). 
There was no evidence to support a finding that deviating from the four corners of 
the contract was legally supportable. No finding of fraud, undue influence, material non-
disclosure of fact was made. None were alleged. Appellee testified that she was aware 
of the water shares long before the parties mediated, had the benefit of legal counsel for 
months preceding the mediation and during two mediation sessions. (R.65 -79.) Her 
attorney drafted the agreement. There was never an argument by Appellee that there was 
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a "mutual mistake" or any other defense against the validity of the negotiated contract 
crafted with the assistance of counsel at mediation. 
While it is possible to set aside a stipulation or contract on the basis of mistake, 
"(a) party cannot avoid a divorce decree simply by 'claiming a mistake in entering into a 
stipulation on appeal" Collins v. Collins, 1999 UT App 187 at * 1 (unpublished) (quoting 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding stipulation binding 
where wife was represented by counsel and took an active part in the negotiations)); 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding stipulation binding 
even where a mistake existed). 
The trial court should not be permitted to cure or rescue Appellee from her own 
neglect when legally represented and when present on two mediation occasions and when 
she admitted to personal knowledge of the water shares for a long period of time. To 
allow the Court to paternalistically and arbitrarily redefine the parties negotiated 
mediation agreement puts any other negotiated and stipulated term at risk and undermines 
the purposes of mediation and contract law generally. 
Furthemore, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the shares were not 
appurtenant to the land where the shares specifically state on their face that they are 
appurtenant to the land. (See Appellee's Ex. 17.) Because the shares were appurtenant to 
the land, they were covered by the mediated agreement and the court abused its discretion 
when it found that the shares were not a part of the agreement. 
31 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT COMMINGLED PREMARITAL FUNDS AND CASH 
GIFTS MADE DURING THE MARRIAGE BY TEMPORARILY DEPOSITING 
THEM INTO AN ACCOUNT IN APPELLEE'S SOLE NAME TO PROTECT 
THEM FROM SEIZURE BY HIS FORMER SPOUSE. 
Fulfilling Marshalling Requirement 
Appellant submits the following evidence to comply with his duty under U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding which he 
challenges: 
1. Appellant started a corporation prior to the marriage, in 1999 or 2000, doing 
business as Mountain Lion Engineering. (R. 307-08.) 
2. Appellant performed freelance engineering for his business, Mountain Lion 
Engineering, for a time during the marriage. (R. 10, 54, 442.) 
3. Appellant used an account ("Lorena Liston Account") at Barnes Bank, which was 
in the name of his mother, Lorena Liston. (R. 112, 302-03; Ex. 27.) 
4. Appellant testified he used the Lorena Liston Account to protect his money from 
his ex-wife (R. 156-57, 160, see also Findings, 16), because he was fearful that his 
ex-wife would access his money. 
5. Appellant stated that some of the revenues of Mountain Lion Engineering were 
deposited into the Lorena Liston Account. (R. 310; see also Findings, 16-17.) 
6. Appellant stated that operating expenses of Mountain Lion Engineering were 
occasionally paid from the Lorena Liston Account. (R. 3\\\see also Findings, 16-
17.) 
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7. Appellant deposited income earned working for Mountain Lion Engineering into 
the Lorena Liston Account. (R. 54-56, 59, 420-21; Ex. 9, 59.) 
8. Appellant testified that he paid personal and family expenses from the Lorena 
Liston Account. (R. 328.) 
9. The trial court held that the "Lorena Liston account," held marital funds where 
"respondent channeled all of his day-to-day income and expenses, including his 
marital earnings, which were substantial during this period" into that account. 
(Findings, 16-17.) 
10. Although Appellant argued that at least $120,000 transferred from the Lorena 
Liston Account to another account were gifts from his mother, the court stated that 
it did not have any doubt that the money transferred was marital property. 
(Findings, 17.) 
11. The court stated that "[w]ith respect to the other sums that respondent claims were 
gifts from his mother, he proffers no documentary evidence or other evidence that 
would support his claim." (Findings, 15.) 
12. At one point, Appellant transferred funds from all his other accounts to account 
ending in 162, which was an account in the sole name of Appellee. (R. 345-47, 
354; see also Findings, 16.) Appellant's stated purpose for the transfer of the funds 
to Appellee's account was to protect the funds from his former wife, Betty Liston. 
(R. 345-47, 354; see also Findings, 16.) The money remained in Appellee's 
account for about six months, after which it was "transferred to account ending in 
7442, which respondent opened, this time in his mother's name." (Findings, 16.) 
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A. Appellant asserts the trial abused its discretion in determining that $ 
273,050 in his accounts was marital property. 
It is conceded that Appellant's earnings during the marriage in his Mountain Lion 
Engineering business was marital property. Those earnings ($30,028.68) are clearly 
traceable and distinguishable from transfers of his pre-marital accounts and marital gifts 
from his mother. It is requested that this Court find that definable, traceable earnings 
may be marital property but that the act of merely depositing them into any account 
during the marriage does not, in itself, render the remainder of the account with 
additional non-marital funds marital property. 
The conveyance by Appellant of separate property in his Fidelity Investments 
accounts, which also received a transfer of his marital earnings from Mountain Lion 
Engineering that were deposited into his Barnes Bank account, created a presumption of a 
gift that transmuted the property to marital property. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT 
App 373, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah 1999). 
Appellant asserts that his sole act in placement of his funds into an account under 
Appellee's sole name did not constitute comingling. Appellant's express intent was to 
protect the assets from his ex-wife for a short period of six months, and not to create a 
property interest in the appellee. The funds were not consumed by the parties, nor 
increased in value by contributions from the Appellee. The presumption is rebutted by 
the mere fact that the funds were at one time in his name, then for a short period, in his 
wife's name, then restored again to him. 
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If the standard by which the act of temporarily transferring accounts to the sole 
name of a spouse by itself changes the identity and character of those assets from 
"separate" to "marital" property, then the same standard should apply when the same 
spouse transfers the same assets back to his sole name, by which act the identity of the 
property should be restored to its former separate property status. 
The trial court first erred by accepting the Appellee's expert testimony. The 
witness testified that she had no prior experience as an expert witness in a divorce setting. 
She testified that she did not consider herself an expert witness. The witness did not file 
a report as required under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a)(3). U.R.C.P. 
26(a)(3). The trial court abused its discretion by overruling Appellant's objection to her 
testimony. This constitutes one of the "fatal flaws" in the evidence upon which the trial 
court relied in its determination that $ 273,050 in his accounts was marital property. 
The trial court then erred by characterizing Appellant's accounts as "marital." The 
C.P.A. witness Rebecca Schreyer testified that she did not consider the source of funds 
which were transacted during the marriage. She testified that in her opinion, if 
transactions occur during a marriage that makes them "marital." The testimony of the 
parties was indisputable that the Appellee did not make any contributions into these 
accounts. They were sourced entirely by the Appellant. It was Appellant's stated intent 
to conserve the funds, not comingle them with the Appellee, nor to consume them. The 
Appellant took painstaking care to keep his finances separate. Appellee did likewise. 
Without evidence to identify the source of funds that were deposited during the 
marriage, other than Appellant's own testimony that they were sourced from gifts from 
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his mother and in making numerous transactions of the same funds (which were 
admittedly appreciating over time) into different accounts to protect them from 
garnishment by his former wife, the Appellee did not meet her burden of proof. It is 
requested that this Court find that the trial court erred in characterizing the accounts as 
marital, except for the $30,028.68 which Appellant admits were marital earnings from 
Mountain Lion Engineering. 
Generally, "[pjremarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as 
separate property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each party 
retain the separate property brought to the marriage." Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987) (citing Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982)). However, this is 
not an invariable rule. Id. "Exceptions to this general rule include whether the property 
has been commingled, whether the other spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, 
maintained, or protected the separate property, and whether the distribution achieves a 
fair, just, and equitable result." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)). "Particularly, '[pjremarital property may lose its separate 
distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate, or 
where one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate,' [citing 
Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321], or 'in extraordinary situations where equity so demands,' 
[citing Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, f 19, 45 P.3d 176]." Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT 
App 169, ffif 22, 235 P.3d 782 (first alteration in original). 
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In Kimball v. Kimball, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court 
that inherited funds received from the sale of stock that were placed in a joint account and 
then moved to a separate account retained their character as separate property and were 
appropriately awarded to the spouse who inherited them in the first instance. Kimball v. 
Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ffi[ 4-5, 217 P.3d 733. The deposits were simply considered 
as transfer points, not an ownership conveyance or comingling. David S. Dolowitz, 
Conundrum Revisited, 23 Utah Bar Journal 3, at 14 (May/June 2010) (citing Kimball)). 
In this case, Appellant made a deposit of funds that were entirely his premarital 
property and placed funds into an account solely under the name of the Appellee. There 
was never a dispute that the Appellee made no contributions to any of his accounts. Her 
only marital financial contribution was to incur more and more credit debt of which 
Appellant had little, if any knowledge of and had no control over. There was no evidence 
of consumption as each party used their individual credit cards to pay for general living 
expenses. There was no evidence of intent to create a joint property interest or to share 
the funds. It is requested that this Court find that the temporary use of Appellee's name 
for the preservation and protection of premarital funds does not constitute a transmutation 
or comingling to change the identity of the funds to a marital asset, and find that the trial 
court abused its discretion by doing so. 
The oft-times confusing and hard to understand history of Appellant's deposits, 
withdrawals, and creations of financial accounts during the marriage are irrelevant as to 
the initial finding that must be made and the primary issue, which is the proper 
identification of the source of those funds. The case law in Utah is clear that premarital 
37 
separate property, together with its appreciation, retains its separate character following 
the marriage unless the exceptions are found. It matters not how many transactions may 
have been made during the marriage if the funds were separate property to begin with. 
The only evidence admitted as to the source of funds in dispute came from: 
a) Appellant's premarital accounts, 
b) Gifts made to Appellant before and during the marriage and, 
c) Earnings during the marriage of $38,028.68 transferred from Appellant's Barnes 
Bank into his Fidelity Investments accounts that were held under the name of the 
Liston Family Trusts. 
With the exception of the Mountain Lion Engineering earnings deposited into 
Barnes Bank, all other monies are clearly discernable, traceable and were from separate 
or gifted property of the Appellant. Appellee's accountant admitted that she did not 
consider the source of funds, only focusing on marital transactions with admissions that 
at least some of the funds were in fact Appellant's premarital funds. 
While a trial court has discretion to award "inherited or donated property," such 
property "as well as its appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate from the 
marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse in a property division incident to 
divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); see also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987) (declining to award a portion of plaintiff s inheritance to defendant where 
the appreciation in value was due to inflation, and the defendant had not contributed any 
effort to increase the value of the property). 
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A finding that assets have been commingled is not appropriate unless, "the 
property completely loses its identity and is not traceable because it is commingled with 
other property (sometimes called transmuted)." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
307 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). 
Another exception to the general rule that "property acquired by gift or inheritance 
by one spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce" is where "the acquiring 
spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to make 
it marital property." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988) (citation 
omitted). It is of great significance that the transfer by Appellant of his entire financial 
accounts in question were made to an account held only in the name of the Appellee and 
not to a jointly held account. This constitutes further evidence of a lack of intent to share 
the funds as marital. Appellee did not bring forth evidence to support that this case 
presented an extraordinary situation where equity demands division of Appellant's 
separate, non-marital property. 
"'[P]roperty which comes to either party by avenues other than as a consequence 
of their mutual efforts owes nothing to the marriage and is not intended to be shared.'" 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988) (quoting Hussey v. Hussey, 280 
S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270 (Ct. App. 1984)). Based upon Appellant's testimony of 
his intent to protect the assets and not commingle them and the history of both parties in 
keeping their finances separate, Appellant requests that this Court find that the trial court 
clearly abused its discretion in characterizing the entire accounts as marital. 
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POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY INDEPENDENTLY ACCESSING 
APPELLANT'S PRIOR DIVORCE ACTION FILE, REFERRING TO IT WHILE 
INTERROGATING THE APPELLANT, AND REFERRING TO IT IN MAKING 
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO COUNSEL. 
The trial court asserted "judicial notice" as its basis for independently obtaining 
the court docket in Appellant's prior divorce case in the Second District Court for Davis, 
County and referring to it while questioning the Appellant while he was on the witness 
stand. (See Utah R.Evid. 201 (stating the rule for judicial notice)). Neither counsel for 
the parties had provided this information to the court beforehand, nor was counsel for 
either party given any advance notice by the court that it was conducting its own 
discovery into Appellant's prior divorce action and would refer to it. 
A, The trial court erred when it abandoned its role as a neutral arbiter and 
became an advocate in the judicial proceedings. 
The court's neutrality was impaired when it became a participant in the judicial 
proceedings by actively seeking out the presentation of additional evidence in this case. 
The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard are further aggravated by the fact 
that a trial court acting sua sponte has abandoned its impartial position and has 
become an advocate for one party over the other. See Ricketts v. Midwest Nat. 
Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1184 (7th Cir.1989). "Preservation of the integrity of the 
adversarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from infringing upon 
counsel's role of advocacy . . . ." Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1983). 
Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P. 2d 1374, 1384-85 (Utah App. 1994). The court erred in sua sponte 
conducting its own discovery into the case by accessing Appellant's prior divorce records 
and questioning Appellant concerning them. The court abandoned its neutral role and 
became an advocate for the Appellee, thus infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy. 
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B. It was improper for the court to take judicial notice of Appellant's prior 
divorce case where the files of that case were not placed in evidence. 
A court may take judicial notice of records in its own case. In re F.M., 2002 UT 
App 340, [^ 3 n.2, 57 P.3d 1130. Under certain circumstances, a court may also take 
judicial notice of records in another case. "It is true that notice may be taken of the record 
of another case. But for this to be done it should be so offered in evidence by a party, or 
so stated by the trial court, so that it will be known to them what is being relied on." 
Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 177 (Utah 1977). The Carter court quoted State in 
Interest of Hales: "'In any case the court should not take notice sua sponte of the 
proceedings in another case unless the files of the other case are placed in evidence in the 
matter before the court.'" Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 177 n.2 (Utah 1977) (quoting 
State in Interest of Hales, 538 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Utah 1975) (citing 29 Am.Jur.2d, 
Evidence § 58)); see also State v. Shreve, 514 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1973) (stating that 
"records of other proceedings in the court cannot be judicially noticed and must be 
introduced in evidence in order to be considered in the pending case."). 
In the instant case, the records of Appellant's prior divorce case were not placed 
into evidence. Consequently, it was error for the trial court to use them to question the 
Appellant and to refer to them in its Findings of Fact. 
The trial court erred when it accessed Appellant's prior divorce records and used 
them in questioning Appellant and in making its findings of fact. This was error because 
the court abandoned its neutral role and became an advocate, did not provide notice that it 
would be conducting its own discovery in to Appellant's prior divorce case, and the 
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records the court relied upon were not placed into evidence. Appellant was prejudiced by 
the Court's errors, and asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING 
APPELLEE ATTORNEY FEES WHLE DENYING APELLANT ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
Fulfilling Marshalling Requirement 
Appellant submits the following evidence to comply with his duty under U.R.A.P. 
24(a)(9) to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding which he 
challenges: 
1. The court found that "based on the issue of fault, primarily respondent's ongoing 
and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and otherwise 
avoid being accountable for his court ordered marital obligations, an award of fees 
is appropriate. The point of the award is that in the Court's view, respondent has 
made this case much more difficult than it should have been." (Findings, 23.) 
2. The court found "that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be 
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial compensation 
for the many hours of work and effort that have gone into bringing this matter to 
conclusion." (Findings, 23.) 
A. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award attorney fees to 
Appellee where the award was not based on sufficient evidence, and the court 
did not make sufficient findings. 
This Court should find that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny 
Appellant's request for attorney fees incurred in successfully defending himself against 
Appellee's petition to obtain a protective order, but awarding Appellee $5,000.00 in 
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attorney fees in this case, where it was demonstrated that the Appellant does not have 
marital financial resources to do so, and there was no affidavit of Appellee's counsel as 
required under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 102(a). U.R.C.P. 102(a). 
Utah Code section 30-3-3 provides that in a divorce proceeding, a "[trial] court 
may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3(1) (2007). 
"Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within 
the trial court's sound discretion. Significantly, the award [or denial of such fees] 
must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability 
of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. And, 
[fjailure to consider these factors is grounds for reversal on the fee issue." 
Stonehocker v. Stonehockei\ 2008 UT App 11, \ 10, 176 P.3d 476 (quoting Oliekan v. 
Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^ 30, 147 P.3d 464) (alterations in original). In this case, the 
court did not find that the Appellee had a financial need for attorney fees. On the 
contrary, the court stated that "[b]ased on the awards set forth above, the Court does not 
find that either party has an inability to pay fees incurred." (Findings, 23.) 
Furthermore, although the court found that awarding Appellee $ 5,000 was 
"completely fair and equitable" (Findings, 23), the court did not have a factual basis to 
determine that $ 5,000 was a reasonable award of attorney fees where counsel for 
petitioner did not submit an affidavit of attorney fees. Because the court did not make the 
required factual finding that Appellee had a financial need for attorney fees and did not 
have a sufficient factual basis to determine that $5,000 was a reasonable award of 
attorney fees, this court should reverse the trial court's attorney fee determination and 
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remand. These errors constitute "fatal flaws" in the evidence and factual findings of the 
court which justify remand. 
Instead of basing an award of attorney fees on the factors enumerated in 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f^ 10, as set forth above, the court imposed fees based on 
the "fault" of the Appellant: The court found that 
based on the issue of fault, primarily respondent's ongoing and blatant attempt to 
hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable 
for his court ordered marital obligations, an award of fees is appropriate. The 
point of the award is that in the Court's view, respondent has made this case much 
more difficult than it should have been. 
(Findings, 23.) However, the court did not specifically enumerate any instances of 
Appellant's conduct as a basis for imposing fees. {See id.) Apparently, the court was 
imposing attorney fees, at least in part, because Appellant's shifting of funds between 
different accounts to protect assets from his former wife made the instant divorce case 
more complex. Appellant's conduct in this regard was not motivated by a desire to make 
the instant case more difficult, and is not an appropriate basis for imposing attorney fees. 
By awarding Appellee attorney fees, Appellant is forced to draw from the only 
available source he has: his separate, premarital funds. The effect is a tacit award to 
Appellee of a portion of his premarital, separate property that would not otherwise be 
obtainable. It further diminishes the income producing assets which Appellant spent his 
lifetime developing and which he is dependent upon. 
Appellant asks this Court to find that in the instant case, the trial court did not 
apply this standard correctly when neither party could afford to pay the attorney fees of 
the other and, as such, it was an abuse of discretion. An award for attorney fees "must be 
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based on sufficient findings," Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, | 14, 76 P.3d 716 
(internal quotation marks omitted), "and the failure to make such findings requires 
remand for more detailed findings by the trial court," id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Appellee gave almost no testimony and no documentary evidence as to her 
attorney fees. Therefore there is virtually no evidence to sustain the judgment. 
Each party testified that their monthly incomes consisted primarily of Social 
Security income. Each testified that they garnered additional small amounts of income. 
Appellant prevailed on several disputed issues. Neither party prevailed on all or 
substantially all trial issues. The court denied Appellee's request for alimony (Findings, 
22; Decree, \ 6), and found that neither party, both of whom are retired, have the ability 
to support the lifestyle they enjoyed during marriage (Findings, 22). Having an inability 
to pay alimony in any amount, it does not follow that the Appellant either has the ability 
to pay Appellee's attorney fees in any amount either. 
CONCLUSION 
The court abused its discretion when it found that $ 30,500 of Appellee's credit 
card debts were a marital obligation where there was insufficient evidence to support the 
determination that such obligations were incurred for family purposes. It was also an 
abuse of discretion for the court to find that the water shares were not covered by the 
mediated agreement and that they were not appurtenant to the land where the water 
shares stated on their face that they were appurtenant. 
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The court abused its discretion in determining that $ 273,050 in Appellant's 
accounts was marital property. Appellant asserts that a substantial portion of these funds 
were his traceable premarital property and gifts from his mother. 
The court erred and abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of records in 
Appellant's prior divorce case and using them to question Appellant where those files 
were not placed in evidence. Furthermore, the court abandoned its impartial role and 
infringed on counsel's role of advocacy when it sought out additional evidence in the 
case and used the records without prior notice. 
Finally, it was an abuse of discretion to award Appellee attorney fees. The court 
did not find that Appellee was in need of attorney fees and counsel did not submit an 
affidavit of attorney fees, which is necessary to determine that attorney fees are 
reasonable. Appellant asks this Court to reverse the determinations of the trial court, as 
set forth above, and remand for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (y^ day of March, 2011. * 
^tHarkKWara 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact, issued July 2, 2010; 
Decree of Divorce entered July 15, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI^.?. ,*J"'^ 
nThird Judicial District 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH JUL 0 2 2010 




FINDINGS OF FACT, 




CASE NO. 084900427 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This divorce action was tried to the Court on June 24 and 25, 2010. 
Todd D. Gardner appeared for petitioner and Clark R. Ward appeared for 
respondent. Following the testimony of the parties and additional 
witnesses, and closing argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. Having now fully considered all of the evidence and 
applicable law, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, and 
specific Rulings on each of the issues presented by the parties. The 
Findings and the Rulings are intended to provide a sufficient factual and 
legal basis for a Decree of Divorce to be prepared by counsel for 
petitioner, but if either counsel believes additional Findings are 
necessary, they may be included as long as they are supported by the 
record and consistent with this Ruling and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The parties to this action are both 73 years of age. They 
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originally met during the 9th grade of high school, but they did not marry 
until May 20, 2002, after each of the parties had been married and 
divorced on two prior occasions. Before the parties were married, they 
lived together commencing approximately 1999, at which time petitioner was 
divorced from her second husband, and respondent was still married, but 
in the process of obtaining a divorce. 
2 Respondent's divorce Decree was entered in January, 2002, and 
the parties were married the following May. 
3 The parties announced an engagement on New Year's Eve, 1999, 
at which time respondent presented petitioner with a wedding/engagement 
ring. It is disputed whether the ring presented at that time included a 
substantial diamond at its center. It is not disputed that the ring as 
it now exists does not include a primary diamond, but that it now consists 
of small diamond pieces surrounding a cubic zirconium. The Court cannot 
determine whether there was ever a large diamond in the ring, but the 
Court does find that respondent either deliberately misled petitioner at 
the time of engagement and for several years thereafter into believing 
that he had bought her a genuine diamond, or alternatively, respondent had 
an original diamond replaced by cubic zirconium sometime after the 
marriage. 
4 The Court cannot determine the value of the ring, with or 
without a diamond. The insurance renewal for the ring, which was dated 
in 2001, more than a year after the ring was purchased, showed a maximum 
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insurance value of $14,000. Respondent recalls that he paid about $475, 
which included his wedding band. 
5 The parties disagree on whether the marriage was ever a happy 
one. It is agreed that they separated on or about January, 2008. There 
is some dispute over the precise date, but the Court finds that a date of 
approximately January 15, 2008, is close to the reality, and sufficient 
for the Court's need to establish a date when the marriage effectively 
ended. 
6 As discussed with counsel at the close of trial, and pursuant' 
to the Court's discretion to determine a date for division of property, 
debts, and financial assets, the Court will use the January 15, 2008 
separation date, rather than the date of trial. Using this date, the 
Court finds that the parties were engaged in a bona fide marriage for 
approximately five years and eight months. The Court specifically finds 
that the parties lived separate lives, both physically and in the 
management of their finances, from the date of separation. 
7 As stated above, the parties disagree as to the essential 
happiness of their relationship. The Court finds that petitioner's belief 
that the parties were generally happy in their marital association is 
correct, but it is also true that their happiness was marred by 
disagreements regarding inappropriate activities conducted by respondent, 
which the Court finds did occur, but which the Court also finds do not 
need to be examined in any further detail. The parties engaged in marital 
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counseling at various times during the marriage, including in the first 
year or so, but the fact of this counseling and the concerns that prompted 
the parties to go to counseling, do not play any significant part in the 
Court's determination of the issues presented at trial. 
8 The Court has reviewed, and taken judicial notice of, the 42 
page docket reflecting the course of the divorce case between respondent 
and his second wife, which matter was handled in Davis County. The Court 
is also aware that petitioner has been divorced on two prior occasions, 
but the Court does not have substantial or detailed information regarding 
the cause of those divorces. 
9 Based on both the court docket and the testimony of the 
parties, primarily respondent's own testimony, the Court finds that 
respondent has very actively taken steps to protect his financial 
interests, both with respect to the second divorce, and during this 
marriage, which is not of itself improper, but the Court finds that 
respondent has gone well beyond measures to protect what is legitimately 
his. It is clear from the docket and respondent's own testimony, that he 
was willing to undertake any acts, including substantial deception, to 
shield assets that should have been available to satisfy claims of his 
former wife, which claims were vindicated by Court Judgments. 
10 Respondent claims that his difficult second divorce and his 
necessary efforts to protect his assets are evidence that he took 
appropriate steps to preserve all separate property in the present 
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marriage. The Court disagrees. Despite respondent's prior experiences 
regarding marital and separate assets, and whatever his desires, the Court 
finds that in many respects he was ineffective in separating and shielding 
assets from the reach of petitioner. For example, respondent alluded to 
an "agreement" between the parties to this marriage regarding separate 
finances, but no such agreement was written, and neither was any such 
agreement conceded by petitioner. This is so despite the fact that 
respondent had a property agreement in his second marriage, which 
agreement apparently was invalidated by the Court. Nevertheless, the Court 
finds that respondent understood the option of preparing either a pre- or 
post-nuptial agreement to protected or segregate assets, and did not do 
so. 
11 The Court finds that as part of his effort to protect or hide 
assets from the reach of his former spouse, respondent maintained the 
majority of his liquid funds in a* Barnes Bank checking account in the name 
of his mother, Lorena Liston. The respondent candidly admitted that none 
of those funds actually belonged to his mother, although some of them may 
have been received initially as gifts from his mother. Nevertheless, the 
Lorena Liston account, which was a fiction invented to obscure and shield 
respondent's financial dealings, was in fact respondent's primary account 
during much of the parties' relationship. Among other deposits into that 
account, respondent routinely deposited earnings from his freelance work 
as a consultant/engineer. These deposits represented marital earnings, 
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which were deposited into an account controlled solely by respondent. 
12 During the marriage, the parties did keep separate financial 
accounts, but the Court finds that the fact that the accounts were in one 
or the other sole name does not mean that the parties' finances were not 
combined in substantial ways. For example, both parties had individual 
credit cards, which cards were used for the entire range of expenses and 
purchases, including items purchased for the individual, and items 
purchased for the benefit of the household. As a general rule, items 
purchased generally throughout the course of a marriage, particularly 
including food, clothing, utilities, and all of the usual expenses of day-
to-day living, are considered marital expenses, not subject to scrutiny 
or allocation after the parties divorce or separate. 
13 In this case, the evidence is persuasive that petitioner 
incurred debt related to family expenses in the amount of at least 
$30,500, which debt was unpaid at the time of separation. Except for a 
disputed item regarding purchase of a motor vehicle, there is no evidence 
to suggest that any purchases on the account at issue were for 
petitioner's individual benefit or that those purchases resulted in 
acquisition of individual property that should be addressed in an ultimate 
personal property allocation by this Court. 
14 The transaction raised by respondent relates to an undisputed 
purchase of a motor vehicle for about $10,000, which amount was charged 
to a credit card while it was bearing zero interest. Petitioner testifies 
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that the debt was paid off before the parties separated, and it is not 
part of the $30,500 debt balance she took at the time of separation. 
Respondent claims that by check number 282 from the Lorena Liston account, 
in the amount of $10,900, he in fact paid off that debt. The Court has 
examined the check at issue carefully, and agrees with petitioner that the 
memo entry, in respondent's handwriting, refers to a home or house 
purchase payment. The Court believes the first word is "house," 
petitioner believes that word is "home," but regardless .of the precise 
word, there is no suggestion on the check that it related to a vehicle 
purchase or debt payment. Furthermore, even if respondent used funds to 
pay off a debt on his wife's credit card, more than two years before the 
parties separated, which sum is not a part of the $30,500 debt that 
petitioner seeks to divide between the parties, there is no basis for the 
Court to second guess the motive for that payment during the marriage. 
15 The Court finds that the vehicle that was paid off during the 
marriage was traded in on a new vehicle for petitioner, at the insistence 
of petitioner's daughter, who the Court finds paid the remainder of the 
cost of the new vehicle. 
16 The new vehicle in question is a 2005 Subaru, which is 
petitioner's present vehicle. Respondent claims an interest in this 
vehicle, as marital property. Apart from the fact that respondent asserts 
what this Court deems to be an inflated present value for the Subaru, the 
Court finds that the evidence is clear that except for the $3,400 down-
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payment, which came from marital funds, the vehicle w^s a gift to 
petitioner, which gift was never converted to marital property. 
Having determined the foregoing facts, the Court now turns to its 
rulings on each of the specific issues submitted to it, which rulings will 
include by necessity additional specific findings: 
Grounds and Jurisdiction 
The Court finds from the evidence that the parties were both 
residents of Salt Lake County at least 90 days before the filing of this 
matter, although respondent is now a resident in Davis County. Therefore, 
the Court h^s jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. It 
is apparent from the evidence that the parties h^Ve suffered 
irreconcilable differences, such that the marriage cannot be preserved, 
and they should be awarded a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
Petitioner7s surname 
Petitioner has asked to be restored to the use of her prior surname; 
to wit: Lindsay. She should be permitted to change her naitie to Lindsay 
upon execution of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
Real Property 
The parties initially lived in a mobile home (to be addressed in the 
personal property section below) but within a few months of marriage, they 
moved into a house on approximately one acre of land located at 1835 
Gunderson L^ne in Salt Lake County. There was argument at trial about 
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whether the property was in fact marital, but that issue has been almost 
entirely resolved by a mediation agreement that both parties submitted to 
the Court to resolve the real property issue, except for the disputed 
issue of water shares. Nevertheless, the Court is concerned that there 
may be lingering doubts about whether the property was in fact marital. 
In the event that is the case, the Court now states its findings and 
conclusions that both parties contributed to the down payment on the 
house. The amounts may have been similar, if a loan from respondent's 
mother is excluded, but regardless, they each contributed at least $8,000, 
and the fact that petitioner's contribution was in the form of foregoing 
her real estate commission is of no consequence, because that was money 
to which she was fully entitled. In addition, mortgages were paid by 
respondent, but out of an account from which he paid numerous household 
expenses, and which account received money that could only be considered 
marital property. Both parties worked to maximize the value of the 
property and accomplish a subdivision, which they did successfully. All 
of these factors make it clear to the Court that the property was marital. 
The foregoing determination is apparently consistent with the 
parties' conduct in negotiating a settlement of any interest petitioner 
may have in the property at the time of mediation. The agreement that was 
received by stipulation makes it clear that petitioner should receive 
$10,000 upon execution of a Quit-Claim Deed. There is a dispute whether 
or when that Deed was executed. Regardless, that is an act that still 
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needs to occur. The Court finds that the $10,000 was consideration for 
petitioner giving up all interest in the real property on Gunderson Lane. 
The real property included shares in Holliday Water Company, one of which 
shares the Court finds was, in fact, appurtenant to the property. 
Subsequent to the subdivision, and at the time of the mediation agreement, 
there were four shares in Holliday Water Company which are related to the 
real property. Based on the testimony of the Holliday Water Company 
Manager, which the Court found to be persuasive, the Court finds that only 
one of the four shares is in fact appurtenant to the property. More 
specifically, this share is tied to the single meter on the property 
titled in the parties' names, and is absolutely necessary to permit the 
property owner to receive culinary water from Holliday Water Company. 
The remaining three shares are undisputedly valued at $5,000 each. 
Those shares represent three of the total 7,200 shares issued by the Water 
Company. The value of those shares is that installation of a meter in any 
of the areas served by Holliday Water Company must be tied to a single 
share of stock for service to be provided. Accordingly, there is a market 
for individual shares as property owners add water service. The other 
value of the shares is that for each share held, the owner is entitled to 
60,000 gallons of free water each year, perhaps twenty percent of the 
modest requirements of one family. At current rates, that benefit is 
worth about $63 per year, and the Court finds, consistent with the 
testimony of the Manager, that the real value of a share is in the ability 
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to obtain a new service to a new meter, and not the ability to obtain an 
additional 60,000 gallons of water per year, without charge. 
The Court determines that the three non-appurtenant water shares 
were not covered by the mediation agreement for satisfaction of 
petitioner's interest in the real property. Those shares are marital 
property, with a total value of $15,000. Respondent shall be ordered to 
pay to petitioner the total sum of $7,500 for her half interest in the 
shares, or he may alternatively transfer one share to petitioner, and pay 
$2,500 to equalize the division. Petitioner is ordered to execute a Quit-
Claim Deed as soon as possible in exchange for the yet to be tendered 
payment of $10,000 as provided by the mediation agreement. 
Marital debts 
The Court does not see where respondent identified any marital debts 
for allocation. Petitioner has established debts of at least $30,500, 
which sum the Court finds to be supported sufficiently by the evidence. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence supporting any argument that 
petitioner incurred the $30,500 for her exclusive benefit, or that the 
parties did not benefit through the course of the marriage from her 
expenditures. Petitioner did not have the income to support many of the 
expenses she was called upon to pay in the'marriage. It is true that 
petitioner terminated full-time work, and cut back substantially on her 
part-time working activities, but at the time of the marriage each of the 
parties was 65 years old. There was no agreement or requirement that 
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petitioner would continue to work, and until the parties' marriage, while 
they were living together, respondent paid virtually all of their 
expenses. 
During the marriage, petitioner paid for many day-to-day expenses, 
including food, entertainment, Christmas for families, and travel. The 
Court is not determining that she paid all of these expenses, but she made 
substantial payments towards these items. For the foregoing reasons, the 
Court finds that the $30,500 in debt as of the date of separation in 
January, 2008, is a marital obligation, to be shared equally. Respondent 
shall be ordered to pay $15,250 to petitioner to satisfy his share of the 
marital debt. The Court finds that the debt is in fact outstanding for 
one or more credit cards, none of which bear respondent's name, and he 
should have no liability therefor. Nevertheless, in the event there 
should be any claim made against respondent by a creditor for said debt, 
petitioner shall be ordered to indemnify and hold him harmless therefrom 
after respondent pays his $15,250 allocation. 
Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Order to 
Show Cause Regarding Use of Assets 
There are two proceedings that occurred during the pendency of 
this action that give rise to opposing claims for attorney fee 
reimbursement. In June, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for a 
Protective Order, in which she alleged she was in fear of respondent, 
specifically based on what she perceived as a threat contained in a 
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letter respondent wrote to her attorney approximately one week prior. 
The Petition was unsuccessful, but this Court determined, as stated 
during trial, that as to the core issue of fear, and the existence of 
an implied threat by respondent, implying the potential use of force, 
including using deadly force, the allegations were not manifestly 
untrue. This Court does not second guess the determination of the 
Court that denied the Protective Order, but neither can this Court find 
that there is any basis for an award of attorney's fees based solely on 
the fact that the Order was dismissed. 
On the other hand, the parties were clearly engaged in efforts to 
protect assets during the pendency of the action. Respondent was 
ordered to not use more than $10,000 each month from the various 
investment accounts he controlled, but in August, 2009, respondent 
withdrew about $195,000 to purchase his present home. It is true that 
respondent gave notice of this intention, through his counsel, but 
respondent's notice was mere lip service. That is, he gave notice to 
his counsel, counsel acted promptly to convey the notice and a request 
for an exception to the Order to petitioner's counsel, imposing a very 
short deadline, but respondent went ahead and completed the transaction 
without waiting for that date to pass. 
Respondent's main response to criticism of his actions is that he 
had a good faith belief that the money was his. In fact, he almost 
certainly did have a right to the sum he withdrew, and more, at the 
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appropriate time, but such belief, right or wrong, does not justify 
respondent in ignoring a Court Order. There is no request for a 
finding of contempt, and none will be made, but the Court does find 
that respondent should reimburse petitioner the amount of $500 as a 
reasonable amount for attorney's fees incurred in relation to this 
matter. Such award shall be in addition to any other attorney's fee 
award that may be granted herein. 
Investment and Retirement Accounts 
Respondent has accumulated various monies over the years, 
including before this marriage, which are held in a series of Fidelity 
Investment accounts. During the marriage some accounts have been 
closed, some funds have been transferred, and others have been 
combined, resulting in the necessity for the Court to unravel separate 
and marital property for division as part of this divorce action. 
The Court was greatly aided in this task by the analysis and 
testimony of Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, but the Court also applied its own 
legal analysis and application of the facts to modify the recommended 
allocation provided by Ms. Schreyer. The Court concludes that Ms. 
Schreyer's initial analysis, set forth in her letter of December 18, 
2009 (petitioner's Exhibit 28) provides the best starting point. 
First, the Court agrees with the ultimate determination that 
respondent's rollover IRA account ending in the numbers 3460 was 
respondent's premarital property, with no additions or reductions 
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during the period of May 2, 2002 through January 15, 2008, which dates 
the Court finds to be appropriate for analysis. Accordingly, any 
amounts in that account are respondent's sole property. 
The Court also agrees that account number ending in the digits 
5706, and the balance of $72,065.66 at the time of marriage, were 
premarital property. There is a tenable argument that subsequent 
activity in this account could convert the entire account to marital 
property, but petitioner does not urge that position strongly, and the 
Court agrees that her forbearance from so doing is consistent with an 
equitable approach to this account. Starting on October 30, 2002, 
however, funds were added to that account in the total of $77,559.89 
all of which funds were added during the marriage. Respondent claims 
that some or all of those funds came from his mother, as a gift. There 
is one exception, a check for $4,500 dated March 23, 2004, which came 
from respondent's business account. Such sum is clearly marital 
property. 
With respect to the other sums that respondent claims came from 
his mother, he proffers no documentary evidence or other evidence that 
would support his claim. Even if the Court was inclined to believe 
those sums might have come as a separate gift, subsequent actions 
involving this account, combined with the lack of evidence regarding 
the source of the funds, persuade the Court that all of these amounts 
should be treated as marital funds. With these additions, the account 
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grew to $161,984.31, and the entire amount was transferred to an 
account ending in the number 3162, which account was in petitioner's 
sole name. 
Respondent admits that he made that transfer, and claims without 
any apparent understanding of the irony of the situation, that he did 
so to protect the money from garnishment for sums due to his second 
wife, pursuant to judgments in Davis County. That transfer occurred on 
June 1, 2004, and about six months later the money in account ending 
3162 was transferred to account ending 7442, which respondent opened, 
this time in his mother's name. The Court does not believe that 
respondent claims that the money was in fact his mother's, but even if 
he made such a claim, it is clear to the Court that the use of his 
mother's name on this Fidelity account (7442) was simply another device 
to protect money, either from his second wife, or from petitioner. 
This series of transactions leads the Court to further analysis focused 
on the funds in account ending 7442. 
The amount transferred from account 3162 in petitioner's name, to 
7442, in Lorena Liston's name, was $169,415.85. The transfer occurred 
in January, 2005. Account 7442 was opened in November 2004 with a 
$30,000 deposit, check number 208, from the Lorena Liston account, 
maintained solely by respondent, for his benefit. Respondent claims 
that these were not marital funds, but the Court has already determined 
that this was the account in which respondent channeled all of his day-
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to-day income and expenses, including his marital earnings, which were 
substantial during this time period. The Court does not have any doubt 
that the $30,000 that funded the account initially, and subsequent 
deposits in the total amount of $95,000 ($90,000 from the personal 
account in the name of Lorena Liston, from May 2005 through March 2006, 
and $5,000 from respondent's business account, which funneled business 
earnings, on May 2, 2005) comprise marital property. Accordingly, the 
only difference the Court has with Ms. Schreyer on her accounting of 
deposits to account 7442 from 29 November, 2004 through 15 March, 2006, 
is that she apparently omitted the $5,000 business account deposit. 
The Court notes at this point that none of the accounts discussed 
thus far include retirement funds, except for the account that has been 
determined to be separate property. 
The Court's analysis now comes to another difference with Ms. 
Schreyer. Ms. Schreyer identifies account number ending 2680 as a 
retirement account, which opened on April 1, 2002 with a balance of 
$123,215.12. She looks at a deposit in November of 2006, and a 
transfer to account 5584, in December 2007, and assumes that the entire 
marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account 
5584. Ms. Schreyer then identifies a balance of $24,924.97, which was 
transferred in March, 2008, to account ending 5385, which is the last 
account that appears to have held the funds, based on the evidence 
available at trial. 
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After hearing the evidence of all of the parties, the Court 
determines that the funds held in account 2680, and the transactions 
discussed by Ms. Schreyer, do not in fact constitute either receipt or 
transfer of marital funds. This account is determined to be entirely 
the property of respondent, and the transfer of $24,924.97 into account 
5584, is determined to be separate property owned by respondent. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court adjusts the calculation 
on page 2 of Ms. Schreyer's letter (petitioner's Exhibit 28), by 
deducting $19,924.97 from the balance in account 5385 as shown on the 
Exhibit. This sum is reached by subtracting $24,924.97, and adding the 
$5,000 from the business check deposit during the term of the marriage 
that was not included by Ms. Schreyer. One more adjustment needs to be 
made. The Court deducts the $97,027 premarital value, resulting in a 
marital interest at the time of separation in the amount of $273,563, 
but the Court further reduces that sum by $513, to $273,050. The 
reason for this final deduction is that Ms. Schreyer's analysis 
included growth in the fund. The Court applied the percentage of the 
total that represented growth, and determined the difference between 
the growth on the amount determined by Ms. Schreyer ($293,558) and the 
amount determined by the Court ($273,050). 
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court determines that 
petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest in investment 
accounts the total sum of $136,525. The Court notes that based on the 
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records presented at trial, this sum is available and held in non-
retirement funds, and the Court finds no basis to determine that 
petitioner does in fact have any interest in designated retirement 
funds, which funds to the extent they still exist should be awarded in 
their entirety to respondent. 
Personal Property 
The personal property issues present some difficulties, but more 
based on the emotional component issues than the numbers or 
characterization of property. Both parties feel that they have been 
treated unfairly by the other, and that certain property awards should 
be made in the interest of fairness, and to validate each party's 
subjective belief regarding that fairness. The Court will do its best 
to address those issues in turn, and briefly: 
(a) Mobile home. The first item is the mobile home in 
which petitioner is living, as well as a second mobile home she owns. 
Both of those mobile homes are premarital property; there is a credible 
claim that petitioner holds one of homes in constructive trust for her 
brother; and the value is likely less than respondent asserts, and not 
substantial. Because the Court finds that respondent has no interest in 
the properties, they are awarded to petitioner, with no final 
determination of value. 
(b) Hollidav Water Shares. These shares have already been 
addressed in connection with real property, and shall be allocated as 
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set forth herein. 
(c) Violins. The Court is persuaded that respondent has 
spent substantial sums purchasing violins during the marriage, but the 
unrebutted testimony is that he did so from funds received through 
selling or trading other property that was indisputably premarital. 
Respondent shall retain all violins with no compensation to petitioner. 
(d) Engagement/wedding ring. Petitioner is awarded the 
wedding ring in its present condition, without any credit to 
respondent. The ring was a gift. The Court must find that the 
petitioner has not met her burden of showing that there was a diamond 
in the ring when it was given to her, although it is admitted that 
there is no diamond in the ring now. Even if petitioner did in fact 
meet her burden.of showing it was a diamond, she has failed in her 
burden to establish the value of the ring, including a diamond. 
Regardless of what the ring once was, it was a gift to petitioner, it 
is in her possession, and she may retain it without any credit to 
respondent. 
(e) 2005 Subaru Legacy Outback. This vehicle is 
petitioner's sole property, except for the contribution of the down 
payment of the marital vehicle. That sum was $3,400. This Court is 
unaware of any principle that would require it to award a share in the 
full amount of the down payment, because the value of the traded 
vehicle and the new vehicle both depreciated before separation, but the 
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Court finds it equitable that respondent should receive $1,000 as 
compensation for the trade-in from the vehicle purchased during the 
marriage from marital funds. 
(f) Premarital property owned by respondent. The Court 
finds that a number of items, including all of the older vehicles, are 
respondent's sole property. They include the 1963 Chevrolet pickup, 
the 1942 Ford, and other older vehicles and engines, etc., that were 
listed at trial, whether they are in their current form, or whether 
that asset has been sold and replaced with other assets. Unless 
specifically stated herein, petitioner has no interest in any such 
assets. 
(g) Miscellaneous property. Each of the parties shall be 
awarded the general furniture, televisions and other such items in 
their possession. These items do not have substantial value, they are 
no longer necessary for day-to-day living, and no value should be 
ascribed. The Court is concerned about the cavalier disregard shown by 
respondent in the lack of care taken for certain furniture items owned 
by petitioner, but petitioner also took too long in following through 
to pick up those items. Based on the values at issue, the amount of 
funds already divided herein, and because the only basis to award 
compensation to petitioner for these items would be essentially 
punitive, which the Court is unwilling to resort to on these issues, 
the parties will simply be awarded furniture and other items in their 
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possession, with no financial value ascribed. The Court, in fact, 
believes that the parties have come out very even in terms of the 
distribution of the relatively nominal personal property that- was 
marital. 
Alimony 
Alimony is a difficult issue in this case in some ways. Neither 
party, both of whom are now retired, has sufficient income, excluding 
any potential investment income, to support the lifestyle they enjoyed 
during the marriage. Both, however, will have investment funds 
following the allocation decided herein, which will provide the ability 
to do two things: One, the parties, particularly petitioner, will have 
the ability to pay off all consumer debt, thus reducing her monthly 
expenses very substantially. Petitioner will also receive a 
contribution from respondent to pay of marital debt. Second, any sums 
remaining after debt reduction may be used to generate modest return. 
The Court may not invade the individual funds remaining after 
allocation of all property to provide alimony assistance except in 
extreme cases, and the Court cannot make any such determination in this 
case. This is particularly true in light of the age of both parties and 
the relatively short marriage. For these reasons, no alimony will be 
awarded. 
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Attornev/s fees 
Based on the awards set forth above, the Court does not find that 
either party has an inability to pay fees incurred, but the Court finds 
that based on the issue of fault, primarily respondent's ongoing and 
blatant attempts to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and 
otherwise avoid being accountable for his Court Ordered and marital 
obligations, an award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award 
is that in the Court's view, respondent has made this case much more 
difficult than it should have been. Both of the attorneys in this case 
are very able and they have acted with the utmost integrity and 
professionalism. Neither is asserting a claim for attorney's fees in 
any amount close to what could be justified given the complexity of 
what should have been a much more simple case. Nevertheless, the Court 
finds that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be 
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial 
compensation for the many hours of work and effort that have gone into 
bringing this matter to conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for petitioner is directed to prepare a final Decree 
consistent with the Findings and Rulings set forth herein. This 
document may serve as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for 
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that purpose. 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2010. 
By the Court: 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 084900427 
Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
The above-entitled matter came before the court and was tried June 24 and June 25, 2010. 
Petitioner was represented by Todd D. Gardner and Respondent was represented by Clark R. Ward. The 
Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact, Ruling and Order on July 2,2010, and that document 
being incorporated by reference as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter and being 
otherwise fully advised, it is hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of of irreconcilable differences to 
become final upon entry of this decree. 
2. Petitioner shall be returned to her former surname; to wit: Lindsay 
3. Respondent shall pay to Petitioner $15,250 to satisfy his share of the marital debt. In the event 
that there should be a claim made against Respondent by a creditor for said debt, Petitioner shall indemnify 
and hold harmless Respondent therefrom after Respondent pays his $15,250.00 allocation of marital debt. 
4. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located at 
1835 Gunderson Lane in Salt Lake County, Utah. That real property, pursuant to the Mediation Agreement 
the parties entered into December 2, 2009, shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall pay to 
Petitioner $10,000.00 for her interest in the marital home upon Petitioner signing a quit claim deed 
conveying her interest in the property to Respondent. 
5. Respondent shall pay to petitioner the total of $7,500.00 for her half interest in the three non-
appurtenant water shares that the parties own with Holliday Water Company. Respondent may 
alternatively transfer one share to Petitioner and pay and additional $2,500.00 to Petitioner to equalize 
distribution. 
6. No alimony shall be awarded in this matter. 
7. Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner the amount of $500.00 as a reasonable amount of 
attorney's fees incurred by Petitioner having to enforce and Respondent violating the $10,000.00 per month 
investment withdrawal limits as ordered by the court during the pendency of this action. 
8. Petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest from the parties investment accounts in the 
the total amount of $136,525.00. 
9. Petitioner shall be awarded the interest in her mobile home that she may have without any claim 
by Respondent. 
10. Respondent shall retain all violins without compensation to Petitioner. 
11. Petitioner shall be awarded her wedding ring in its present condition. 
12. Respondent shall receive from Petitioner $1,000.00 as compensation from the trade-in from the 
2005 Subaru Legacy Outback purchased during the marriage from marital funds. 
13. Petitioner shall have no interest in the 1963 Chevrolet Pick-Up, the 1942 Ford and other older 
vehicles and engines, etc. that were listed at trial. 
14. An additional award of $5,000.00 shall be paid by Respondent to Petitioner's attorney as 
additional compensation for attorney's fees. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / ^ day of ., 2010. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT 
RpberfK/Hilder - ^ \ W^:'W I 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT^U&£E...">-;V f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this G? day of / /> -^ -< 2010, that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following: 
Clark R. Ward 
6925 Union Park Avenue, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Todd D Gardner 
